[TT-15266] POC

[mativm02]

Description

Related Issue

Motivation and Context

How This Has Been Tested

Screenshots (if appropriate)

Types of changes

• Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
• New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
• Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change)
• Refactoring or add test (improvements in base code or adds test coverage to functionality)

Checklist

• I ensured that the documentation is up to date
• I explained why this PR updates go.mod in detail with reasoning why it's required
• I would like a code coverage CI quality gate exception and have explained why

[github-actions]

📦 Impact Review Snapshot

Effort	Downstream Updates	Compatibility	Docs	TL;DR
High	⚠️	🟡	⚠️	Major Go version upgrade (1.21.5 → 1.23.10) with godebug settings and dependency changes requires downstream updates

## Impact Assessment

This PR appears to be a proof of concept that significantly upgrades the Go version from 1.21.5 to 1.23.10 and introduces godebug settings along with numerous dependency updates. The changes will have cascading effects on all downstream repositories that depend on the Tyk Gateway codebase or interact with it. The Go version upgrade is particularly significant as it may introduce breaking changes in behavior, especially with the added godebug settings which modify TLS behavior.

## Required Updates

1. tyk-operator:

   • Update Go version to match or be compatible with 1.23.10
   • Update shared dependencies to align with gateway versions
   • Test against new API definition schemas if any were modified

2. tyk-charts:

   • Update container image specifications to use compatible Go version
   • Update configuration templates to accommodate any new configuration options
   • Review resource requirements as newer Go versions may have different performance characteristics

3. portal:

   • Ensure compatibility with any API definition schema changes
   • Update client libraries that interact with the gateway

4. tyk-sink (MDCB):

   • Update Go version to match or be compatible with 1.23.10
   • Align shared dependencies with gateway versions
   • Test RPC protocol compatibility with updated dependencies
   • Verify compatibility with any changes to API definitions or policies

## Compatibility Concerns

1. Go Version Compatibility: The jump from Go 1.21.5 to 1.23.10 is significant and may introduce breaking changes, particularly with the godebug settings that modify TLS behavior:

   godebug (
     tls10server=1
     tls3des=1
     tlsrsakex=1
     tlsunsafeekm=1
     x509keypairleaf=0
     x509negativeserial=1
   )
   

   These settings enable deprecated/insecure TLS features which suggests backward compatibility requirements with older systems.

2. Dependency Version Mismatches: The PR updates numerous dependencies which could cause conflicts if downstream repositories use different versions.

3. Configuration Changes: The extensive config.go file suggests potential configuration structure changes that would need to be reflected in tyk-charts.

4. TLS Configuration: The godebug settings specifically target TLS behavior, which could affect secure communications between components.

## Summary & Recommendations

• This PR represents a significant upgrade to Go 1.23.10 with godebug settings and dependency changes that will impact all downstream repositories.
• Recommend comprehensive testing across all downstream components before merging.
• Ensure documentation is updated to reflect the Go version requirements and any configuration changes.
• Consider a phased approach to rolling out these changes, especially if the godebug settings are intended to maintain backward compatibility with older systems.
• Create a migration guide for downstream repositories to align with these changes.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /dependency <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Tyk Gateway Dependency Impact Reviewer

[github-actions]

🛡️ Security Snapshot

Effort	Risk Level	Tests	Compliance	TL;DR
Medium	🟡	⚠️	❔	New multi-authentication feature introduces potential security risks without adequate testing

## Security Impact Analysis

This PR introduces a new "MultiAuth" feature that allows APIs to accept multiple authentication methods as alternatives (OR conditions). The implementation allows requests to be authenticated if any one of several configured authentication methods succeeds. While this provides flexibility, it potentially weakens the authentication model by allowing the least secure authentication method to become the security baseline.

## Identified Vulnerabilities

Medium Risk:

• Authentication Downgrade Attacks: The OR authentication logic could allow attackers to bypass stronger authentication methods by exploiting weaker ones in the chain.
• Inconsistent Identity Management: Different authentication methods may produce different identity information, potentially causing inconsistent authorization decisions.
• Session Management Complexity: The code clears session state between authentication attempts but may not fully handle all edge cases.

Low Risk:

• Logging Exposure: The middleware logs which authentication method succeeded, potentially exposing information about the authentication infrastructure.
• Error Message Information Leakage: Aggregated error messages might reveal too much information about available authentication methods.

## Security Recommendations

1. Add Comprehensive Tests: Implement thorough security tests for the multi-auth feature, including tests for authentication downgrade scenarios.
2. Consider Authentication Strength Ordering: Implement a mechanism to try stronger authentication methods before weaker ones.
3. Normalize Identity Information: Ensure consistent identity information regardless of which authentication method succeeds.
4. Add Audit Logging: Enhance logging to record which authentication method was used for successful requests for security monitoring.
5. Implement Method Restrictions: Allow API designers to specify which combinations of authentication methods are acceptable rather than any single one.
6. Review Error Messages: Ensure error messages don't reveal unnecessary information about authentication configuration.
7. Document Security Implications: Provide clear documentation about the security implications of using multi-auth.

## OWASP Compliance

The implementation raises concerns related to several OWASP Top 10 categories:

• A2:2021 - Cryptographic Failures: The OR logic may allow bypassing stronger cryptographic authentication methods.
• A7:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures: The feature could lead to authentication bypass if not properly configured.
• A9:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: While basic logging is implemented, more comprehensive audit logging would be beneficial.

The code does show attention to proper error handling and session management, which aligns with OWASP best practices.

## Summary

• This PR introduces a significant new authentication feature that allows multiple authentication methods as alternatives.
• The lack of dedicated tests for this security-critical feature is concerning.
• The implementation could lead to authentication downgrade attacks if not properly configured.
• Recommend adding comprehensive tests, considering authentication strength ordering, and enhancing audit logging before merging.
• The feature should be documented with clear security guidelines for API designers.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /security <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Security Impact Reviewer Prompt

[github-actions]

🚀 Performance Snapshot

Effort	Perf Risk	Hot Paths	Benchmarks	TL;DR
Unknown	🟡	❔	❔	Unable to assess performance impact due to lack of visible changes in the PR

## Performance Impact Analysis

Without visible code changes in the PR (noted as "Diff contained only files filtered out by heuristic"), it's impossible to provide a specific performance impact analysis. The PR is labeled as a POC (Proof of Concept) for ticket TT-15266, but no implementation details are available for review.

## Critical Areas

If this POC involves any of these performance-sensitive areas, careful consideration should be given:

1. API and Policy Loading - Changes to /gateway/api_loader.go or /gateway/policy.go could impact startup time and API reload performance
2. Regex Endpoint Path Evaluation - Modifications to path matching in /gateway/model_urlspec.go can significantly affect request routing speed
3. Connection Handling - Alterations to /gateway/reverse_proxy.go or Redis connection pools may impact throughput
4. Analytics Processing - Changes to analytics workers in /gateway/analytics.go could affect system resource usage
5. Rate Limiting - Modifications to rate limiting logic may impact request processing latency
6. Caching - Changes to response caching can have substantial performance implications

## Optimization Recommendations

For this POC implementation:

1. Consider adding benchmarks to measure performance impact before and after changes
2. Pay special attention to hot paths in request processing
3. Profile memory usage if the POC introduces new data structures or caching mechanisms
4. Test with realistic traffic patterns to identify potential bottlenecks
5. Consider the impact on startup time and API reload operations

## Summary

• Without visible code changes, a specific performance assessment cannot be provided
• The PR being labeled as a POC suggests experimental changes that should be thoroughly benchmarked
• Any changes to request processing, authentication, rate limiting, or caching require careful performance testing
• No suggestions to provide – change LGTM.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /performance <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Performance Impact Reviewer Prompt

[github-actions]

🚦 Connectivity Review Snapshot

Effort	Tests	Security	Perf	TL;DR
Low	⚠️	🔒 none	🟢	Cannot assess connectivity impact due to insufficient PR details

## Connectivity Assessment

• Redis Connections: Tyk Gateway relies heavily on Redis for key storage, caching, analytics buffering, and pub/sub notifications. Any changes affecting these connections should be carefully reviewed.
• RPC Connections: In MDCB mode, the Gateway connects to a central management node via RPC for API definitions, policies, and key management. The connection is established through RPCStorageHandler.Connect() and maintains state through rpcClientIsConnected().
• Synchronization Mechanisms: The system uses Redis pub/sub on tyk.cluster.notifications channel for configuration changes and reloads. Any modifications to this mechanism could affect cluster-wide synchronization.

## Test Coverage Validation

• Redis Tests: The codebase has basic tests for Redis connectivity in storage/redis_cluster_test.go, but these primarily test error handling when Redis is down rather than actual connection flows.
• RPC Tests: Limited test coverage for RPC connections exists, mostly in the form of mocks like RPCDataLoaderMock. More comprehensive tests would be beneficial.
• Failure Scenario Tests: The code has some self-healing mechanisms for DNS resolution failures in RPC connections, but test coverage for these scenarios appears limited.

## Security & Performance Impact

• Authentication Changes: RPC connections use API keys and TLS for security. Any changes to these mechanisms should maintain or improve security posture.
• Performance Considerations: Redis connection pooling is critical for performance. The RPCPoolSize setting controls connection pool size for RPC connections.
• Error Handling: The system has sophisticated error handling with backoff strategies for reconnection. Changes should preserve this resilience.

## Summary & Recommendations

• Without specific details on the PR changes, it's difficult to assess direct connectivity impact.
• Any modifications to Redis or RPC connectivity should be thoroughly tested for both normal operation and failure scenarios.
• Changes to connection pooling, authentication, or error handling deserve special attention.
• Consider adding more comprehensive integration tests for connectivity components, especially for failure recovery scenarios.
• No suggestions to provide – change LGTM.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /connectivity <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Connectivity Issues Reviewer Prompt for Tyk Gateway

[github-actions]

🚀 Performance Snapshot

Effort	Perf Risk	Hot Paths	Benchmarks	TL;DR
Medium	🟡	⚠️	❔	New MultiAuth feature adds sequential authentication attempts that may impact request latency

## Performance Impact Analysis

This PR introduces a new MultiAuthMiddleware that implements "OR" authentication logic, allowing APIs to accept multiple authentication methods as alternatives. The middleware sequentially tries each authentication requirement until one succeeds, which fundamentally changes the authentication flow. This sequential processing pattern could significantly impact request latency, especially when multiple authentication methods fail before finding a successful one.

## Critical Areas

The most performance-sensitive area affected is the request processing path. The ProcessRequest method in MultiAuthMiddleware tries each authentication requirement in sequence, clearing session state between attempts. This creates a potential N+1 problem where each failed authentication adds cumulative overhead. The implementation also builds aggregated error messages and performs multiple logging operations, which adds memory allocation and CPU overhead on the critical path.

## Optimization Recommendations

1. Consider parallel authentication: For low-latency APIs, consider implementing parallel authentication attempts rather than sequential processing.

2. Add performance metrics: Instrument the code to measure time spent in each authentication attempt to identify bottlenecks.

3. Optimize error handling: The current implementation builds verbose error messages for each failed attempt. Consider using a more lightweight approach for failed auth paths.

4. Implement early termination: Add configuration to specify a preferred order for authentication methods and terminate early for obvious failures.

5. Add benchmarks: Create benchmarks comparing single-auth vs multi-auth performance with various authentication combinations.

## Summary

• The MultiAuth feature introduces sequential authentication attempts that could significantly impact request latency in worst-case scenarios
• Memory usage increases due to storing multiple middleware instances and aggregating error messages
• The critical request path now includes potential multiple authentication attempts where previously only one was tried
• Logging overhead increases with debug messages for each authentication attempt
• Consider adding benchmarks and instrumentation to measure the actual performance impact in real-world scenarios

---

Tip: Mention me again using /performance <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Performance Impact Reviewer Prompt

[github-actions]

📦 Impact Review Snapshot

Effort	Downstream Updates	Compatibility	Docs	TL;DR
Medium	⚠️	🟡	⚠️	New multi-auth feature introduces OR authentication logic requiring updates in downstream repositories

## Impact Assessment

This PR introduces a significant new feature for multi-authentication in the Tyk Gateway, allowing APIs to accept multiple authentication methods as alternatives (OR conditions). The implementation adds new structures to the OAS authentication schema and a new middleware that tries each authentication requirement sequentially until one succeeds. This change will impact downstream repositories that interact with API definitions, particularly those that need to understand or manipulate authentication configurations.

## Required Updates

1. tyk-operator:

   • Update API definition schema handling to support the new MultiAuth field in Authentication struct
   • Add support for processing multiple security requirements in OAS definitions
   • Update CRD validation to accommodate the new authentication structures

2. tyk-charts:

   • No direct configuration changes required, but documentation should be updated

3. portal:

   • Update API definition handling to support the new multi-auth configuration
   • Update UI components to allow configuring multiple authentication requirements
   • Add validation for the new authentication structures

4. tyk-sink (MDCB):

   • Update API definition handling to properly synchronize the new multi-auth configuration
   • Ensure RPC protocol correctly handles the new authentication structures when transferring API definitions
   • Update GetApiDefinitions RPC method to handle APIs with multi-auth configuration

## Compatibility Concerns

1. Schema Compatibility: The addition of the MultiAuth field to the Authentication struct is backward compatible as it's optional, but downstream systems need to be updated to properly handle this field.

2. Authentication Logic: The new OR authentication logic is a significant change from the current AND logic. Systems that assume only one authentication method is active may behave unexpectedly.

3. BaseIdentityProvider Determination: The dynamic determination of BaseIdentityProvider at runtime based on the successful authentication method could cause issues in systems that expect this value to be static.

4. Testing Gap: There appear to be no tests for this new feature yet, which increases the risk of compatibility issues.

## Summary & Recommendations

• This PR introduces a significant new authentication feature that requires careful coordination across multiple repositories.
• Recommend adding comprehensive tests for the multi-auth feature before merging.
• Documentation should be updated to explain the new authentication model and its implications.
• Consider a phased rollout approach, starting with tyk-operator updates to support the new schema.
• Ensure all downstream repositories are updated to handle the new authentication structures before releasing this feature.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /dependency <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Tyk Gateway Dependency Impact Reviewer

[github-actions]

Multi-Authentication (OR Conditions) Feature Review

This PR introduces a significant enhancement to Tyk Gateway's authentication system by adding support for multiple authentication methods as alternatives (OR conditions) in OAS APIs. This feature allows API providers to configure multiple security requirements where a request is considered authenticated if it passes any one of the configured authentication methods.

Feature Overview

The implementation adds:

1. MultiAuthMiddleware: A new middleware that handles OR authentication logic by trying each security requirement sequentially until one succeeds.

2. OAS Configuration: Support for multiple security requirements in the OpenAPI Specification's security array, where each entry represents an alternative authentication method.

3. Runtime Identity Provider: The base identity provider is determined dynamically based on which authentication method succeeds.

Implementation Details

The feature consists of three main components:

1. Data Structures:

   • MultiAuthConfig: Stores all security requirements and tracks the base identity provider
   • SecurityRequirement: Represents one authentication checkpoint with its required schemes
   • AuthenticationResult: Tracks which auth method succeeded and the resulting session

2. OAS Import Logic:

   • importMultiAuthentication(): Processes multiple security requirements from OAS
   • hasMultipleSecurityRequirements(): Detects if an API uses multiple security requirements

3. Middleware Processing:

   • Sequential attempt of each security requirement (OR logic)
   • Within each requirement, all middleware must succeed (AND logic)
   • Proper session cleanup between attempts
   • Tracking of successful auth method via X-Tyk-Auth-Method header

Security Considerations

The implementation includes several security-focused features:

• Clear session state between authentication attempts to prevent session leakage
• Dynamic base identity provider setting based on successful method
• Detailed error aggregation for failed authentication attempts
• Proper logging of authentication method used for auditing

Potential Improvements

While the implementation is solid, a few enhancements could be considered:

1. Add configuration to prioritize authentication methods based on security strength
2. Implement more comprehensive test coverage for various authentication combinations
3. Add documentation on security implications of using OR authentication logic

Conclusion

This feature provides valuable flexibility for API providers who need to support multiple authentication methods. The implementation is well-structured and maintains backward compatibility while adding new capabilities. The code is clean, well-commented, and follows existing patterns in the codebase.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /connectivity <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Connectivity Issues Reviewer Prompt for Tyk Gateway

[github-actions]

🛡️ Security Snapshot

Effort	Risk Level	Tests	Compliance	TL;DR
Medium	🟡	⚠️	❔	New multi-authentication feature introduces potential security risks without adequate testing

## Security Impact Analysis

This PR introduces a new "MultiAuth" feature that allows APIs to accept multiple authentication methods as alternatives (OR conditions). The implementation tries each authentication method sequentially until one succeeds, effectively creating a logical OR between different security requirements. While this provides flexibility, it potentially weakens the authentication model by allowing the least secure authentication method to become the security baseline for the API.

The feature is implemented through a new middleware (MultiAuthMiddleware) that processes multiple security requirements from OpenAPI Specification definitions. The code properly clears session state between authentication attempts and sets the base identity provider dynamically based on which authentication method succeeded.

## Identified Vulnerabilities

Medium Risk:

• Authentication Downgrade Attacks: The OR authentication logic could allow attackers to bypass stronger authentication methods by exploiting weaker ones in the chain. For example, if an API allows both JWT (with strong cryptographic validation) and basic auth (potentially with weaker password requirements), attackers would naturally target the weaker method.
• Inconsistent Identity Management: Different authentication methods may produce different identity information, potentially causing inconsistent authorization decisions depending on which method succeeds.
• Session Management Complexity: The code clears session state between authentication attempts but may not fully handle all edge cases, especially with complex authentication flows.

Low Risk:

• Logging Exposure: The middleware logs which authentication method succeeded, potentially exposing information about the authentication infrastructure.
• Error Message Information Leakage: Aggregated error messages might reveal too much information about available authentication methods.

## Security Recommendations

1. Add Comprehensive Tests: Implement thorough security tests for the multi-auth feature, including tests for authentication downgrade scenarios and session management edge cases.
2. Consider Authentication Strength Ordering: Implement a mechanism to try stronger authentication methods before weaker ones, or allow API designers to specify a preferred order.
3. Normalize Identity Information: Ensure consistent identity information regardless of which authentication method succeeds to prevent authorization inconsistencies.
4. Add Audit Logging: Enhance logging to record which authentication method was used for successful requests to aid in security monitoring and incident response.
5. Implement Method Restrictions: Allow API designers to specify which combinations of authentication methods are acceptable rather than allowing any single one.
6. Review Error Messages: Ensure error messages don't reveal unnecessary information about authentication configuration.
7. Document Security Implications: Provide clear documentation about the security implications of using multi-auth, particularly the risk of authentication downgrade attacks.

## OWASP Compliance

The implementation raises concerns related to several OWASP Top 10 categories:

• A2:2021 - Cryptographic Failures: The OR logic may allow bypassing stronger cryptographic authentication methods in favor of weaker ones.
• A7:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures: The feature could lead to authentication bypass if not properly configured, especially if a weaker authentication method is included.
• A9:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: While basic logging is implemented, more comprehensive audit logging would be beneficial for security monitoring.

The code does show attention to proper error handling and session management, which aligns with OWASP best practices.

## Summary

• This PR introduces a significant new authentication feature that allows multiple authentication methods as alternatives.
• The lack of dedicated tests for this security-critical feature is concerning.
• The implementation could lead to authentication downgrade attacks if not properly configured.
• Recommend adding comprehensive tests, considering authentication strength ordering, and enhancing audit logging before merging.
• The feature should be documented with clear security guidelines for API designers.

---

Tip: Mention me again using /security <request>.
Powered by Probe AI
Security Impact Reviewer Prompt