fix(deps): update dependency tar to v7 [security] #9323
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This PR contains the following updates:
^6.1.12->^7.0.0GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-64118
Summary
Using
.t(aka.list) with{ sync: true }to read tar entry contents returns uninitialized memory contents if tar file was changed on disk to a smaller size while being read.Details
See:
PoC
A:
B (vulnerable):
Run A and B in parallel on Node.js 22 or >=25.1.0
Dumps
Bmemory (wait for some time to observe text data)Impact
Exposes process memory and could result in e.g. unintentionally (aka attacker-controlled) attempting to process sensitive data rather than tar entry contents. Uninitialized memory can contain unrelated file contents, environment variables, passwords, etc.
To execute, an attacker must reduce the file size to boundary between a tar header and body block, in the time between when the tar archive file size is read via
stat, and the time when the tar archive parser reaches the entry that is truncated. If the file is truncated at a different boundary, then the uninitialized data will very likely not be a valid tar entry, causing the parser to treat the entry as a damaged archive (that is, throwing an error instrict: truemode, or by default, skipping the entry harmlessly).This is conditional on using the
sync: trueoption to thetar.list/tar.tmethod, and the7.5.1version specifically. Earlier versions were not affected.This is also conditional to attacker being able to truncate (or induce a truncation/replacement) of a file on disk (e.g. in cache).
If the tar file is initially larger than the
opt.maxReadSize(16kb by default), then uninitialized memory is not exposed to user code, and instead the program enters an infinite loop, causing a DoS rather than an information disclosure vulnerability.By default,
tar.listdoes not process tar archive entry body content. So, this is further conditional on the user code doing something with the tar entry file contents in anonReadEntrymethod which would expose the file contents (for example, attempting to parse them in such a way that the uninitialized data could appear in an error message).Other methods in this library (
tar.extract, etc.) are not affected by this vulnerability.Release Notes
isaacs/node-tar (tar)
v7.5.2Compare Source
v7.5.1Compare Source
v7.5.0Compare Source
v7.4.4Compare Source
v7.4.3Compare Source
v7.4.2Compare Source
v7.4.1Compare Source
v7.4.0Compare Source
v7.3.0Compare Source
v7.2.0Compare Source
v7.1.0Compare Source
v7.0.1Compare Source
v7.0.0Compare Source
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