fix: avoid unescaping slashes when proxying URLs

[refi64]

Doing all the path operations on URL.Path means that they're being performed on an unescaped URL. Unfortunately, this URL is not guaranteed to be the directly unescaped version of URL.EscapedPath(); in particular, slashes will be unescaped in URL.Path, e.g. given:

/abc%2Fdef

URL.Path will be:

/abc/def

In these cases, URL.RawPath is also set with the escaped version of the path. However, once URL.Path is modified, URL.RawPath is ignored, and URL.EscapedPath() returns the path-escaped version of URL.Path...which, in this case, is now /abc/def, not the correct /abc%2Fdef.

As a result, when performing any path modifications during proxying (i.e. proxying to an upstream URL with a path component, or applying StripPath), this results in any escaped slashes in the proxied URL being unescaped.

In order to work around this, rewriting operations need to take place on the escaped path, not the unescaped one, and then an intermediate URL can be used to determine the Path and RawPath values to set on the forward URL.

This incurs a small breaking change in that StripPath is now applied to the escaped URL, not the unescaped URL. These semantics arguably make more sense, since StripPath otherwise also cannot distinguish between unencoded slashes within a path segment vs those that are separating path segments, but it's still a breaking change nonetheless.

BREAKING CHANGES: This patch changes the behavior of strip_path to be applied to the *escaped* URL as returned by Go's `URL.EscapePath()`, which means that slashes inside path segments, carets, unicode characters, and others that are need to be percent-encoded in strip_path.

Checklist

• I have read the contributing guidelines.
• I have referenced an issue containing the design document if my change
  introduces a new feature.
• I am following the
  contributing code guidelines.
• I have read the security policy.
• I confirm that this pull request does not address a security
  vulnerability. If this pull request addresses a security vulnerability, I
  confirm that I got the approval (please contact
  security@ory.sh) from the maintainers to push
  the changes.
  • (the listed email was contacted in advance and confirmed that this change can be opened as a public PR)
• I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature
  works.
• I have added or changed the documentation.

Further Comments

I debating trying to preserve the current strip_path semantics, but in addition to being unable to distinguish / and %2F, it's also just incredibly ugly: I need to put the value of the attribute in a stub URL and parse that to get the escaped path, which also introduces a large amount of weird edge cases that come from quirks in URL parsers.

[CLAassistant]

All committers have signed the CLA.

[codecov]

Codecov Report

❌ Patch coverage is 80.00000% with 2 lines in your changes missing coverage. Please review.
✅ Project coverage is 77.74%. Comparing base (8fc9b7a) to head (b16e209).
⚠️ Report is 310 commits behind head on master.

Files with missing lines	Patch %	Lines
proxy/proxy.go	80.00%	1 Missing and 1 partial ⚠️

Additional details and impacted files

@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##           master    #1134      +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage   77.90%   77.74%   -0.17%     
==========================================
  Files          80       79       -1     
  Lines        3929     4040     +111     
==========================================
+ Hits         3061     3141      +80     
- Misses        595      618      +23     
- Partials      273      281       +8     

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[emanueleaina]

Any chance to get this reviewed? Thank you!